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J. Brady Hagan[1]
ConocoPhillips has recently seized assets in Curaçao to secure a settlement
it reached with Venezuela after arbitration before the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC) concluded in April.[2] The settlement has suspended a
dispute that once blocked Venezuela’s state-run oil company from exporting
oil from key Caribbean facilities that account for nearly a quarter of
Venezuela’s oil-exporting capacity.[3]
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The settlement relates back to the expropriation of Conoco’s Venezuela
assets in 2007.[4] Conoco left Venezuela after it could not come to a joint
venture agreement with Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), Venezuela’s
state-owned oil company.[5] PDVSA has agreed to pay ConocoPhillips over
$2 billion.[6] Conoco has not yet received any amount of that balance.[7]
Venezuelan o cials have characterized the settlement outcome as a victory,
a “tough lesson” for Conoco, considering the  nal settlement amount is 10%
of the $22 billion initially sought by the oil  rm.[8] That is one way of framing
the situation. What is more likely is that Conoco is afraid of letting slip a
 eeting chance to receive compensation for long-past 2007 expropriation.
Once Conoco successfully took back hard assets and began direct oversight
of oil-producing operations, a precedent was created that might encourage
other entities to hastily close in to secure their investments in Venezuela.[9]
Requests for court attachments on Venezuelan-held assets are now arriving
in the district courts of the United States, and some orders have been issued.
[10] But what Conoco has demonstrated is that arbitration before
international tribunals may be better suited for resolving disputes under
these circumstances than looking to national courts. That is especially true
when dealing with parties like Venezuela, who currently face a myriad of
crushing  nancial obligations and rising political turbulence.
The situation is delicate. Venezuela’s declining macroeconomic condition is
further compounded by sanctions and in uence from the United States,
sanctions that make it more di cult for Venezuela to manage its debt and
raise much needed capital.[11] Those sanctions were put in place out of
humanitarian and economic concern.[12] The Venezuelan government
currently struggles to provide basic food, services, and employment to the
Venezuelan people.[13]
Most signi cantly, Venezuela is struggling to produce oil at even a quarter of
its potential capacity.[14] Reasons for Venezuela’s record low oil production
include theft of equipment from its oil- elds due to growing poverty and
crime,[15] the appointment of the politically connected within PDVSA to
positions that require technical expertise,[16] and, according to some
sources, the malnourishment of experienced Venezuelan oil workers and
their subsequent abandonment of the oil  elds, some  eeing the country
entirely.[17] Unfortunately, Venezuela’s continued ability to produce oil is its
only true means of avoiding insolvency and collapse, and is one of the few
remaining sources of leverage against eager debt-collectors and foreign
in uence.[18]
Venezuela and its creditors are in a predicament, the causes of which are far
too numerous and interconnected to list here.[19] The reality is, Venezuela’s
oil production has declined to such a critical low,[20] in such large part
because of mismanagement, that Conoco’s relatively recent presence in the
Caribbean could be a lifeline for the industry and to Venezuela.[21]
For the time being, the settlement agreement between Conoco and Caracas
has set the entities in tandem towards a single goal: the successful
rehabilitation of Venezuela’s oil-producing assets.[22] The new production of
oil provides longer-term security for Conoco’s settlement award, and
increases Venezuela’s revenue from oil exports, allowing the country to pay
back existing creditors and limit future dependence on outside  nancing. The
entry of Conoco’s technical resources and expertise back into the Caribbean,
as well as its ready access to the United States market, should come as a
breath of fresh air for a struggling PVDSA.[23]
International arbitration has become the mainstay of dispute resolution
between international commercial entities.[24] Mutual consent to fora,
choice of law, and the perceived impartiality of international tribunes have
made arbitration the standard for international dispute resolution.[25] But
perhaps most importantly, arbitration carries a sense that the parties are
meeting half way, that there is no signi cant bias or home eld advantage for
the parties to account for.[26] All these factors encourage voluntary
adherence to the terms of an arbitral award. Such cooperation is especially
important and delicate when a party to a dispute already perceives itself as
embattled or controlled by adverse interests. Venezuela is precisely in that
position. Conoco’s use of arbitration with a country like Venezuela was
advantageous for at least two reasons.
First, while the United States judicial and executive branches are separate in
many respects, current sanctions against Venezuela by the Trump
administration has likely fostered some degree of reluctance in Venezuela to
accept in uence from yet another branch of the United States government.
PDVSA is unlikely to have much interest in being subject to the courts of the
United States. Despite Venezuela’s troubled economy, PDVSA has
demonstrated a willingness to  ght judgments from U.S. courts, adding to
already mounting expenses for the parties involved.[27]
International arbitration, on the other hand, is theoretically more impartial by
design, and it is the voluntary participation and freedom from unwanted
in uence that is thought to produce fairer and more reliable results for both
parties.[28] Reluctant, combative, and uncooperative parties are deal killers,
especially when the parties are separated by vast geographical barriers.[29]
Processes that promote voluntary cooperation produce better results on
average.[30] With president Maduro’s publicly expressed commitment to pay
Venezuela’s debts, further in uence by the United States, a country whose
government is politically averse to the current regime in Venezuela, is
unlikely to foster further cooperation, compromise, and stability at the
moment. Further instability and tension caused by more foreign in uence
will only compromise investments faster.
Second, the ICC and other international tribunals actually bear signi cant
enforcement power.[31] Judgments rendered by the courts of the United
States are comparatively feeble in an international context without direct
enforcement,[32] such as involvement of the United States executive branch,
[33] the imposition of further sanctions, or one of the parties’ own unilateral
enforcement of a judgment. With innumerable parties interested in the
continued stability of the region, those approaches may actually compromise
investments further and destabilize Venezuela. Settling disputes through
voluntary submission to arbitration would perhaps be more effective than the
United States government’s unwieldy attempts to enforce individual rulings
beyond its borders.[34]
There is likely little functional reason for an aggrieved party in Conoco’s
position to choose the United States as a governing body in a dispute over
arbitration before an international tribunal.[35] Financially and politically
unstable parties like Venezuela are more likely to deliver on their obligations
if they feel as though they have some remaining control over the outcome of
their negotiations and that they will be rewarded for voluntary cooperation.
[36] Arbitration is successful and pro table precisely because it avoids the
heavy-handed enforcement against a sovereign party that litigation might
otherwise require.
It is also worth being mindful of the Venezuelan people, who rely on the
continued health of the Venezuelan oil industry and economic stability in the
region. Arbitration is most suited to that end. As is already evident in this
case, arbitral awards like the Conoco-PDVSA settlement are effective when
the interests of both parties are entwined by design of the agreement’s terms
toward a common goal. The parties who will reap the most pro t will be the
parties that recognize the  nancial and functional value of cooperative
arbitration. The unfortunate alternative would be futile, undigni ed
squabbling for scraps of a deteriorating and vulnerable nation,
embarrassingly and unnecessarily sanctioned by United States courts.
Conoco is awaiting a  nal ruling on another case against Caracas  led with
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a
World Bank tribunal.[37] That case also relates back to the previous
expropriation of two of Conoco’s Caribbean oil projects by the Venezuelan
government.[38] A decision is likely to be rendered by the end of the year,
according to a lawyer close to the case.[39] 
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